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be indirectly violated.45 It would seem that a fair and equitable re-
sult can only be reached by the court's applying the doctrine of es-
toppel to save the trustee harmless. Furthermore, it appears that the
statute would have no effect on the beneficiary's revocation of au-
thority to assign future income.40
There is another problem under this statute, i.e., can the trustee
be compelled to carry out the assignment under the statute? Absent
such a statute, a trustee cannot be compelled to commit a breach
of trust by the beneficiary or by any other person.47 Since this Dela-
ware amendatory statute makes legal what was otherwise a breach
of trust, it is submitted that the statute would require the trustee
to carry out the assignment or be subjected to liability if he fails
to do so.
In conclusion, it appears even in the face of a surprising lack of
authority, that the validity of these assignments of either income or
corpus under a spendthrift trust depends upon how far the courts
are willing to go in carrying out the settlor's obvious intentions as
manifested in the trust instrument. 48 It would also appear that the
trustee's liability is dependent upon the jurisdiction in which the
surcharge is sought, its statutory trust scheme, the interest assigned
and the type of trust device employed.
MIC.ArL K. SMarLarR
RES JUDICATA AND JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER
One of the very old dogmas of the law was that a judgment or de-
cree was void if rendered by a court which had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter.' Such a judgment could be attacked either directly or
-'To hold the trustee liable in making an assignment would be to hold him
liable for an act which the statute expressly allows.
"An assignment of income is valid as a contract to assign the property when
received. Hence, the contract is complete when the income accrues, and thereafter
the beneficiary cannot make an effective revocation of his authority. However,
since the contract is not completed in regard to future income, the income not
having accrued, it would follow that a revocation of authority to assign the in-
come would be entirely effective, and the trustee would be subject to liability if he
fails to comply with the revocation.
Ili A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 227 (1948), and cases cited therein.
483 Scott, Trusts § 342.1 (2d ed. 1956).
'Freeman, Judgements § 337 (.5 th ed. 1925).
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collaterally. 2 A shift of emphasis to res judicata, a rationale for giving
finality to a judicial determination, has given rise to a concept which
has considerably diminished the effect of the old dogma. It is now
quite well recognized that a court without jurisdiction over the subject
matter may have jurisdiction to decide whether it has jurisdiction, and
bind the parties thereby.3
While res judicata has been applied rather freely to jurisdictional
issues against a party who actually litigated either the jurisdictional
question or the substantive merits, an interesting question arises as to
whether the doctrine applies against a defaulting defendant after a
joint defendant has actually litigated the case.4 The question was
recently presented to the Michigan courts in the case of Haenlein v.
Saginaw Bldg. Trades Council,5 The case arose out of an alleged un-
lawful labor practice. Two unions and one Dalton, a local representa-
tive of one of the unions, were joined as defendants and all made gen-
eral appearances. Two of the defendants, the Teamsters and Dalton,
joined in an answer asserting among other grounds that exclusive
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause was vested in the National Labor
Relations Board.6 This answer was stricken, and upon the failure of
these defendants to file an amended answer, a default decree was en-
tered against them. The default decree was not attacked within the
prescribed time after entry, not did these defendants appear when
the case was subsequently tried against the other defendant. The de-
fendants, Teamsters and Dalton, then applied to have the default de-
cree set aside-reasserting that the Michigan court had not jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter. The application was denied by the chan-
cellor.
2'rhe rule still holds that "a judgment which is void is subject to collateral
attack both in the State in which it is rendered and in other States." Restatement,
Judgments § 11 (1942).
sRestatement, Judgments § so (1942). For a concise analysis of the development
of res judicata as to jurisdictional issues in cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court, see Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 652 (1940). A similar problem arises in
the conflict of laws when the court of one state assumes to determine the law pre-
scribing the jurisdiction of a court in another state. A typical example of this prob-
lem is brought out when plaintiff sues in state X on a judgment rendered in state
Y and the defendant defends the latter action by challenging the jurisdiction of the
court in state Y. See Comment, 18 Wash. 9- Lee L. Rev. 62 (1961).
'The scope of this comment does not permit a discussion of whether there
might have been sufficient privity between the joint defendants so that a determin-
ation against one defendant could bind the others. See Restatement, Judgments
§§ 83-92 (1942).
6361 Mich. 263, 105 N.V.2d 166 (s96o).
'This assertion was apparently based on the defendants' belief that the plain-
tiff's business was in interstate commerce, in which case the NLRB is thought to
have exclusive jurisdiction.
1961]
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In a split decision, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the de-
cree dismissing the application on the basis of its interpretation of the
Michigan statute prescribing the time during which a default decree
could be attacked.7 Of the jurisdictional argument the court said,
"This jurisdictional question was not open to consideration below, nor
is it here, for want of fact proof... I's Thus a failure to plead and offer
factual proof at trial was held to be sufficient basis for denying the
jurisdictional contention.
A dissenting opinion recommended that the case be remanded for
a factual determination of the jurisdictional question, maintaining
that the defendants' failure to support their asserted defense by factual
proof did not relieve the court of the duty to determine its own juris-
diction.9 The dissenting judge took the view that the decree against
the defaulting defendants was subject to collateral attack and that
"the policy underlying the rule limiting reconsideration [of default de-
crees] must be weighed against the possible confusion that would result
from permitting such a decree to remain outstanding....,10 While the
majority opinion gave little consideration to the alleged jurisdictional
defect, the dissent seems to have regarded it as incurable.
The opposing views initially give the appearance of being ir-
reconcilable. The majority opinion, by dismissing the jurisdictional
contention, would deny a defense in this action which the dissent re-
garded as a potentially successful defense if asserted on collateral at-
tack.11 Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that the majority
opinion was concerned with the application of Michigan law, while
the dissent also took into account the doctrine of pre-emption, a federal
question.
Since the defaulting defendants were afforded the due process
requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, 12 there would
6A Mich. Comp. Laws, App. 4: Rules 28 & 48, Rules of Court (1948).
s15 N.V.2d at 168.
OIt would seem that striking the defendants' answer might be regarded as
an actual determination of the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter, so that
a question for review by the United States Supreme Court was presented. Cf., Bald-
win v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U-. 522 (1931).
20 o5 N.W.2d at 174.
"It is difficult to draw, in theory, the distinction between a "direct" and
a "collateral" attack. One authority states that "where a judgment is attacked in
other ways than by proceedings in the original action to have it vacated or reversed
or modified or by a proceeding in equity to prevent its enforcement, the attack is a
'collateral attack'." Restatement, Judgments § ii, comment a (1942). For the purpose
of invoking res judicata, an attack is collateral, it seems, unless the action is taken
pursuant to the original proceeding in the time and manner prescribed by law.
That is to say that unless there is an available prescribed procedure for direct attack,
the attack is collateral. See Annot., 19i8D L.R.A. 470.
"Hurwitz v. North, 271 US. 40 (1926).
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seem to be no valid objection to the Michigan court's interpretation
of its own state law limiting direct attack, and its decision rendered
pursuant thereto. However, if the subject matter involved in the
Haenlein case is one over which the state court's jurisdiction has
been pre-empted by federal statute, there is a separate jurisdictional
question. There is authority clearly indicating that the question of
lack of jurisdiction by state courts, as a result of federal pre-emption,
can be raised collaterally.1" Still, if' there is a rationale by which the
potential jurisdictional defect can be rectified without a factual de-
termination, the decree should be valid and binding. It is here sub-
mitted that such a rationale must rest on the limit to which a court
feels it should extend the doctrine of res judicata as to jurisdictional
questions.
It is said that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be con-
ferred by the consent of the parties on a court without such juris-
diction, and that the defense of lack of jurisdiction is one of the
strongest known to the law. It cannot be waived by the parties, 4 and
unlike most defenses it need not be raised at any particular stage of
the proceeding.'- Until about two decades ago the authorities were of
the opinion that jurisdiction over the subject matter was a prerequi-
site to any valid judgment or decree, and that in the absence of such
jurisdiction a judgment or decree was void and subject to attack at
any time either directly or collaterally.' 6 The basis for this concept
originated in the idea that a court is the instrument of the sovereign
and subject to such limitations as have been politically imposed.
17
Much of the effect of this dogma has been superseded by expanding
the doctrine of res judicata to jurisdictional matters under the so-
called "Bootstrap Doctrine."' The application of res judicata in this
context is well expressed by the Restatement of Judgments:
'"Kalh v. Fetterstein, 3o8 U.S. 433 (194o). Here the collateral attack was instituted
in the same state court which rendered the foreclosure decree in the original suit.
The attack was sustained by the United States Supreme Court, under a federal
statute which had withdrawn jurisdiction from the state courts to foreclose mort-
gage, on farin land.
"IHome Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (874).
'Matson Nay. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352 (1932).
'", Freeman, Judgments § 337 (5 th ed. 3925).
"See Gaxit, Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter and Res Jttdicata, 8o U. Pa. L.
Rev. 386 (1932).
"Angel v. Bullington. 33o U.S. 183 (1947): Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Atkins. 3io U.S. 381 (194o); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,
308 U.S. 371 (1940); TFreinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 3o8 U.S. 66 (939); Stoll v.
Gottlieh. 305 U.S. 165 (1938); Per v. Groves, 183 Misc. 579, 5o N.Y.S.2d 3oo (Sup.
Ct. 1914).
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"Although the court does not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter, it may have jurisdiction to determine the question
whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and to bind
the parties by its determination, with the result that there-
after they are precluded from successfully contending that the
court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter."' 9
This result is explained by the growing emphasis by the courts "that
it is just as important that there should be a place to end [litigation]
as that there should be a place to begin." 20
Like res judicata, the concept of jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter is based upon public policy;21 one dictates the finality of judgments
and the other requires litigation to be in the proper forum. It would
seem that in a case where both concepts are applicable a result should
be reached by balancing the relative importance of the pertinent
policy considerations.2 2 Therefore, if by assumption there was no
jurisdiction over the subject matter in the Haenlein case, the hold-
ing of the Michigan court may be justified if there were an acceptable
and overriding basis for res judicata.
Before res judicata applies, all parties are entitled to their day in
court.23 Consequently, when either substantive or jurisdictional issues
have been actually litigated the doctrine is more easily found to ap-
ply. A generally acceptable rationale can be worked out whereby a de-
fault judgment will preclude relitigation of substantive issues.24 While
there is some authority to the contrary, it would seem that res judi-
29Restatement, Judgments § io, comment a (1942).
n4Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938).
n"The policy behind the jurisdictional concept is something quite different from
that behind the concept of res judicata. It may well be that good policy dictates
that the jurisdictional concept be preserved, and at the same time that the concept of
res judicata be extended. The policy back of the preservation of the first is largely
political. The courts derive their power to act as courts from constitutions and
statutes, and there are theoretical and practical difficulties in the enlargement of
their jurisdiction by judicial legislation....
"But res judicata is substantive law; and it is common law. There is no
theoretical nor practical difficulty in enlarging it to circumscribe any situation
where it can be used to reach a desirable result." 8o U. Pa. L. Rev. 386-87 (1932).
2-Restatement, Judgments § 10 (1942).
"(2) Among the factors appropriate to be considered in determining that col-
lateral attack should be permitted are that (a) the lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter was clear; (b) the determination as to jurisdiction depended upon a
question of law rather than of fact; (c) the court was one of limited and not of gen-
eral jurisdiction; (d) the question of jurisdiction was not actually litigated; (e) the
policy against the court's acting beyond its jurisdiction is strong."
13This notion is perhaps no more than a figure of speech today. It is ap-
parently embodied in the due process requirements of notice and opportunity to
be heard, which furnish a sufficient basis for a default judgment. See note 12 supra.
2-Morris v. Jones, 329 u.s. 545 (947).
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cata provides a similar rationale for precluding relitigation of juris-
dictional issues after entry of a default judgment or decree.
The case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank25
illustrates that there does not need to be actual litigation of the juris-
dictional question. There a Federal District Court confirmed a re-
adjustment plan in a proceeding to which the plaintiff was a party,
under the authority of a statute later held unconstitutional, but which
was not attacked in the original proceeding. In precluding the plain-
tiff from attacking the judgment collaterally, the United States Su-
preme Court said, "If the general principles governing the defense of
res judicata are applicable, these bondholders, having the opportunity
to raise the question of invalidity, were not the less bound by the de-
cree because they failed to raise it."26 This statement is consistent with
the general rule governing substantive law, in that res judicata will ap-
ply to all jurisdictional matters as well as substantive matters which
might have been raised in the original proceeding.27
Concededly the plaintiff in the Chicot case never actually litigated
the jurisdiction question but only had a reasonable opportunity to do
so. Thus it seems, that where a party has notice and a reasonable
opportunity to litigate a case, he has in effect had his day in court.
It should follow that notice and opportunity to be heard, even in case
of a default decree, may establish a basis for res judicata as to juris-
dictional matters if there are policy reasons for upholding the decree.
The defaulting defendants in the Haenlein case were afforded am-
ple notice and opportunity to be heard. They were served, appeared,
failed to file an amended answer and were later notified of the pending
trial which was completely litigated against a joint defendant. Where-
as the trial of the merits for the collaterally attacking party in the
Chicot case furnished a reason for applying res judicata there, the
trial of the merits against a joint defendant in the Haenlein case
seems to furnish a similar reason. In the Haenlein case the plaintiff
was obliged to proceed in the absence of any reason for a continuance,
and neither he nor the court should be saddled with the burden of
relitigating an issue which could have been decided there, unless there
'53o8 U.S. 371 (1940).
-Id. at 375.
'-"Some courts have held that only those facts actually litigated are foreclosed;
other courts have held that all facts that might have been litigated under the
pleadings are finally concluded; while still others have held that all facts that might
in any way have been litigated are beyond question." 53 Harv. L. Rev. 652 , 659
(19.1o). Perhaps some of the apparent inconsistencies are due to the court's failure
to distinguish between res judicata and the more restricted concept of collateral
estoppel. See Restatement, Judgments § 68, comment a (1942).
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is some countervailing policy reason for denying the normal pre-
cluding effect of res judicata.
28
Two considerations particuarly have been stressed by the authori-
ties as determinative of whether or not res judicata should apply so
as to override the jurisdictional defect. The case of Kalb v. Feuerstein
2-
presented one of the notable exceptions-that of withholding juris-
diction from state courts in order to protect a class of persons in the
federal courts.30 There a state court's decision that it had jurisdiction
to foreclose a mortgage on farmland was held not to be res judicata
on collateral attack. In pointing out the strong public policy against
letting the state court exceed its authority, the United States Supreme
Court said, "Congress set up in the Act an exclusive and easily ac-
cessible statutory means for rehabilitating distressed farmers.... ."31
Whether there is comparable public policy behind the withdrawal
of state courts' jurisdiction over labor disputes affecting interstate
commerce is rather speculative. If only national uniformity were in-
tended, then the effect of res judicata should not be denied
3 2
A second consideration is that which arises when a court assumes
jurisdiction upon a gross misconception of the law, i.e., when there is
a clear lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Coexistent with a
clear lack of jurisdiction would be a stronger policy against res ju-
dicata-perhaps this much of the old dogma remains intact.3 3 No
inference of a clear lack of jurisdiction appeared in the Haenlein case.
The court was one of general jurisdiction and was authorized to try
cases of a similar nature. One might infer that, had there been a clear
nIn situations involving the concepts of res judicata and jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the courts do not purport to deal with absolutes or principles
of universal application. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661
(1944); Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U.S. 199 (1940); United States v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 3o9 U.S. 5o6 (1940); and Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940)
wherein the court found some reason of public policy stronger than the policy be-
hind res judicata.
n3o8 U.S. 433 (194o).
3nState courts' jurisdiction to foreclose mortgages on farm land was pre-empted
and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceeding was vested in the Federal Courts
under the Frazier-L'emke Act, 11 U.S.C. § 2o3 (is 8).
13 o8 U.S. at 443.
"For a discussion of legislative history and background of Federal pre-emptive
legislation, see Note 12 Stan. L. Rev. 208 (196o).
'"Where the determination by the court that it has jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter is obviously erroneous, and particularly where it is based upon an ob-
vious misconception of the law, and especially where the court is one of limited jur-
isdiction, there is a policy against making the determination res judicata and pre-
cluding the unsuccessful party from collaterally attacking the judgment." Re-
statement, Judgments § so, comment b (1942).
